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Abstract
The Spanish Social Security System’s deficit rose to 1.5% of GDP in 2015, in contrast to a 
pre-crisis surplus of 2.2% of GDP in 2007. This deterioration is primarily due to an increase 
in contributory pension spending (as a % of GDP), as a result of the rise in the dependency 
ratio, the increase in the pension replacement rate and the decline in the employment rate. 
Beyond this short-term situation, the Spanish public pension system, as is the case in other 
developed countries, faces major challenges arising from expectations of significant longevity 
gains and the attendant growth of the retirement-age population. In this context, this paper 
aims to contribute to the debate on the situation of the pension system through an analysis of 
its recent evolution, forward-looking projections that include the impact of the latest reforms 
and the challenges outstanding. 
Palabras clave: pension systems, pension reforms, population ageing.
Códigos JEL: H55.
Resumen
El déficit del Sistema de la Seguridad Social español alcanzó un 1,5 % del PIB en 2015, 
que contrasta con el superávit observado antes de la crisis económica, del 2,2 % del PIB 
en 2007. Este deterioro se debe, sobre todo, a un incremento del gasto en pensiones 
contributivas (en % del PIB), como resultado del incremento de la tasa de dependencia, 
el aumento de la tasa de sustitución de las pensiones y la caída de la tasa de empleo. 
Más allá de esta situación de corto plazo, el sistema público de pensiones español se 
enfrenta, como los del resto de los países desarrollados, a retos importantes causados 
por la expectativa de un aumento significativo de la longevidad y, consecuentemente, de la 
proporción de la población en edad de jubilación. En este contexto, este documento tiene 
como objetivo contribuir al debate sobre la situación del sistema de pensiones mediante el 
análisis de su evolución reciente, las previsiones hacia el futuro, que incorporan el impacto 
de las últimas reformas, y los retos pendientes. 
Keywords: sistema de pensiones, reforma de pensiones, envejecimiento de la población. 
JEL classification: H55.
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Executive summary
Public spending on pensions, expressed as a proportion of GDP, depends on three types of 
factors. One is demographic: insofar as spending is essentially linked to retirement pensions, 
spending on pensions is greater when the corresponding age group is more numerous relative 
to the population of working age (i.e. when the dependency ratio increases). The second factor 
is related to the labour market situation: the lower the proportion of the population of working 
age in employment (i.e. the employment rate), the lower GDP will be and, therefore, the higher 
pension spending expressed in these terms will be. The third factor concerns the relationship 
between the average pension and the economy’s average productivity, which is the product of 
the ratio of the average pension to the average wage (the pension replacement rate) and the 
weight of wages in GDP (the share of wages in GDP). Hence, the higher the pension replacement 
rate, the greater pension spending will be. Likewise, given the employment and replacement 
rates, such spending will also be greater the higher the share of wages in GDP. 
As regards revenue, the main source of funding for the Social Security System in Spain 
are social contributions (approximately 85% of its total resources) and, to a lesser extent, State 
transfers to cover non-contributory pensions and top-ups to minimum pensions, which, since 
2013, have now been fully funded with general taxes. In terms of GDP, social contributions 
revenue is determined by the product of the effective rate associated with these contributions 
and the share of wages in GDP. 
The changes in the Spanish Social Security System’s accounts in recent years are 
illustrative of the role played by the different determinants. Hence, the system’s deficit amounted 
to 1.5% of GDP in 2015, in contrast to the surplus of 2.2% of GDP observed in 2007. This 
deterioration is due to the increase in the system’s expenditure and, to a lesser extent, to a 
slight reduction in revenue over the period as a whole (both expressed as a proportion of GDP). 
Specifically, spending on contributory pensions rose by 3.1 pp of GDP over these years, which, in 
keeping with the previous determinants, responds in similar proportions to higher demographic 
pressure, i.e. to a higher dependency ratio, to an increase in the replacement rate and to the 
decline in the employment rate. The marginal 0.4 pp decline in the social contributions/GDP 
ratio is the outcome of the fall in the share of wages in GDP, while there was a small increase in 
the effective rate of social contributions. As a result of the growing deficits, the Social Security 
Reserve Fund, which stood at 6.2% of GDP in 2011, fell by 4.8 pp of GDP to stand at 1.4% of 
GDP at end-2016. 
The challenges facing the public pension system are even more significant from a 
medium and long-term perspective, and arise essentially from the demographic outlook. Indeed, 
on available projections, the increase in longevity and, consequently, in the proportion of the 
population of retirement age, will exert substantial upward pressure on pension spending. 
Specifically, a 65-year-old today has an expected longevity of almost 6 years more than a person 
of the same age in 1975, and it is projected that he/she will live almost 8 years less than a 
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65-year-old in 2060. As a result, the population aged over 67, which accounted for around 10% 
of the total population in the early 1980s, today represents more than 16% and it is projected to 
account for more than 30% as from 2040. 
The pension system reforms introduced in recent years have addressed this challenge 
by, among other measures, putting back the retirement age, introducing a sustainability factor 
linking the initial pension to the increase in life expectancy and approving a new mechanism 
making the annual rise in pensions conditional upon the system’s revenue and expenditure being 
balanced, with ceilings and floors set in place. 
On the estimates available, in benign macroeconomic scenarios in terms of expected 
employment and productivity developments and in which it is assumed inflation will stand at a rate 
of close to 2%, these reforms would largely be successful in countering the effect of the expected 
increase in the dependency ratio on pension spending and, therefore, would contribute to 
restoring the system’s long-term sustainability. Without further increases in the system’s revenue, 
the adjustment mechanism would operate chiefly through reductions in average pensions relative 
to the average wage, i.e. via a significant reduction in the public pension replacement rate. Indeed, 
according to the estimates in the European Commission’s latest report on ageing, the decline in 
the replacement rate in Spain from 2013 to 2060 will be approximately 20 pp. The key mechanism 
for shoring up the sustainability of the System is the new indexation mechanism, which leads to 
below-inflation increases until equilibrium between revenue and expenditure is achieved. 
In the short and medium term, and under the same macroeconomic assumptions and 
given no increases in revenue, the pension revaluation index along with the introduction of the 
sustainability factor from 2019 would reduce the public pension system deficit by approximately 
0.1 pp of GDP per annum, thereby attaining an equilibrium position as from the second half of 
the 2020s. The functioning of the index would lead to annual increases in pensions of 0.25% 
(the floor established by the regulations) every year which, set against growth in the inflation rate 
of around 2%, would generate systematic pension purchasing power losses and progressive 
reductions in the replacement rate. 
Given this outlook, the key is to define the replacement rates of our pension system 
that it is sought to ensure so that revenue can be adjusted so as to guarantee the system’s 
sustainability. The implications for inter-generational and intra-generational equity of the decisions 
adopted should also be made explicit. 
On one hand, maintaining the current replacement rates, which are high on international 
comparisons, would require most significant increases in the system’s revenue. Specifically, 
under the most favourable macroeconomic scenarios considered in this paper, increases in the 
effective rate of taxation of the system of over 10 pp would be required in the long term. In this 
connection, other sources of funding far-removed from those currently used would be needed, 
given that social contributions are already at a high level and significant increases therein would 
have adverse effects on employment.
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On the other, were it decided to reduce public pension replacement rates, a move 
that would follow from the strict application of recent reforms if no new revenue is forthcoming 
for the system, the advantages or disadvantages of other reform alternatives – such as a more 
balanced distribution between the adjustment arising from the reduction in the initial pension and 
that operating via the indexation mechanisms or through further pushing back the retirement 
age – should be studied. Against a backdrop of declining replacement rates, the role of other 
insurance and saving mechanisms that may help top up pensions provided by the unfunded 
public system, such as those set in place in other countries, should also be considered. 
In any event, it is crucial that any reform strategy chosen should increase the system’s 
transparency and strengthen its contributory character, i.e. the relationship between contributions 
and benefits, while at the same time providing for some flexibility to cover the heterogeneous 
needs of the population. Specifically, citizens should be given the necessary information about 
their future pension so that they can take optimal decisions on saving and labour market 
participation. In this respect, given its potential to improve transparency, make individuals’ 
decisions more flexible and support the contributory nature of the system, one avenue of reform 
that has been adopted by a number of other European countries is to complete the transition 
towards a system of notional defined-contribution individual accounts. 
Lastly, beyond the changes that may be made to the pension system, the challenges 
of population ageing must be tackled by means of a broad economic policy strategy. Firstly, 
it is vital that the path of fiscal consolidation should be resumed and that public debt should 
return to a downward trend, so as to meet the targets set in the Stability and Growth Pact at 
the European level and in the budgetary stability laws at the national level in the medium term, 
thereby better positioning public finances to address the issues arising from ageing. Secondly, 
from the macroeconomic standpoint, the sustainability problems of the public finances system 
may be alleviated if employment and productivity in the economy trend favourably. In this 
respect, there is much room for improvement in Spain and structural reforms are needed in 
many areas, such as the labour market and the market for goods and services, in addition to 
education and employee training. The long-term view that should be maintained in the analysis 
of the sustainability of the pension system is, moreover, perfectly compatible with the fact that 
many of the reforms needed to improve employment and, above all, productivity may only be 
deployed and come to fruition after a relatively extensive period of time.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1701
1 Introduction
The economic and financial situation of the Spanish public pension system and the need to 
ensure its sufficiency and sustainability are recurrent topics in economic policy debates. The 
Social Security System’s growing deficits and the diminishing resources available from its Reserve 
Fund have galvanised interest in these issues in recent years.
Indeed, the slower GDP growth and employment observed over the past decade have 
translated into rising pension expenditure and falling revenues from social security contributions, 
which are the main source of funding for this expenditure.1 This has led to a substantial increase 
in the Social Security System’s deficit. Beyond these conjunctural factors, the gradual ageing of 
the population has also pushed up pension expenditure in recent years and will continue to do so. 
Moreover, this trend is likely to intensify and become a permanent feature in the coming decades. 
This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the economic and financial situation of the 
Spanish public pension system by analysing: i) trends in the system’s revenue and expenditure and 
their determinants (Chapter 2); ii) pension expenditure forecasts for the coming decades, factoring 
in the impact of the latest reforms (Chapter 3); and iii) the challenges funding for this expenditure 
poses both now and in the future, and some of the possible reforms and their impacts on the 
system’s sustainability and sufficiency (Chapter 4). The final chapter sets out the main conclusions.
The analysis presented here takes an aggregate perspective and aims primarily to be 
illustrative. Nevertheless, its findings are not qualitatively different from those obtained using more 
ambitious modelling of the interactions between the variables determining the public pension 
system’s revenue and expenditure.
1  All references in this document to the public pension system’s expenditure, revenues and deficits are expressed in GDP 
terms, unless otherwise stated.
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2 The current situation of the Spanish public pension system
As a starting point, this chapter reviews the institutional framework of the Spanish public pension 
system and presents international comparisons of its main elements and characteristics. 
Secondly, it briefly describes the most significant reforms implemented in Spain in the last three 
decades. Lastly, it analyses the trends in the public pension system’s revenue and expenditure 
and their determinants since 1980. 
2.1 The institutional framework
The public pension system in Spain covers a set of contingencies related to ageing (retirement), 
death (survivors’ benefits and family allowances) and illness (permanent disability). There are 
two basic types of pensions, one non-contributory and the other contributory and compulsory. 
The first type are funded with general taxes and are for individuals with levels of income and 
wealth which fall below certain thresholds.2 The contributory pensions are funded with the 
social security contributions of employers and workers (that is, under the pay-as-you-go 
principle).3 The amount of these benefits is calculated on the basis of the individual’s working 
life (contribution years and bases), that is, according to contributory and defined-benefit 
criteria. In addition, the pension amounts must fall within a legally established bracket with 
minimum and maximum pension levels.4 In the case of Spain, private pension funds and plans 
have a very limited scope.5
Public contributory systems with unfunded and defined-benefit pension schemes 
also prevail in EU countries (see Table 1).6 However, unlike Spain, these systems are often 
complemented with capitalisation funds (savings), either in the public sector or through the 
promotion of private funds. Some countries, such as Italy or Sweden, have defined-contribution 
systems which, although based on the pay-as-you-go principle, use an actuarial basis to convert 
accumulated contributions into lifelong pensions.7 
2  These are cash benefits paid to citizens who are in a situation entitling them to protection but whose incomes are below 
a certain level, even if they have never paid social security contributions or have not done so for long enough to entitle 
them to the benefits paid under the contributory system.
3  A pay-as-you-go pension scheme pays out benefits to cohorts of pensioners using pension contributions.
4  Apart from the contributory pensions paid by the social security system, there is a government employee Social Security 
scheme which pays out retirement and survivors’ pensions to State civil servants and military staff.
5  Private pensions funds and plans may be occupational (linked to the company) or individual. The total assets 
accumulated in these funds in Spain account for 9.5% of GDP. 
6  This information has been obtained from the 2015 Ageing Report prepared by the Ageing Working Group, which 
reports to the Economic Policy Committee, which in turn, reports to the Council of the European Union. The group is 
chiefly made up of EU Member States and the European Commission and it cooperates closely with other institutions 
such as Eurostat. Its main task is to prepare ageing-related expenditure projections and to contribute to the long-term 
sustainability of public finances. Every three years, it prepares the aforementioned report on ageing which present long-
term expenditure projections relating to pensions, health care, dependency and unemployment benefits (available at 
http://goo.gl/6S8Is4). 
7  Under these systems (known as notional defined-contribution accounts), the contributions of employees and workers 
are accounted for in individual accounts to which a revaluation is applied on the basis of certain demographic and 
economic variables. The (notional) amount accumulated in this account and life expectancy at the time of retirement are 
among the factors that determine pension values. For a detailed description of the theoretical bases and issues relating 
to this system, see Devesa et al. (2004).
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The expenditure of the Spanish public pension system amounted to 11.8% of GDP in 
2013, slightly above the EU average (10.5%), although the dependency ratio, defined as the 
number of pensioners relative to the working age population (15-64 years) is comparatively low 
(28.9% in Spain in 2013, only above that of Ireland and Cyprus). 
Public pension 
expenditure
(a)
2013
Statutory
retirement
age (b)
2013
Effective
retirement
age (b)
2014
Dependency
ratio (%) (c)
2013
Replacement
rate (%) (d)
2013
Accrual
rate (%) (e)
2013
Pension system
type (f)
Belgium 11.8 65.0 61.9 36.3 42.5 1.5 defined benefit
Bulgaria 9.9 63.7 63.8 45.1 34.2 1.1 defined benefit
Czech Republic 9.0 62.7 63.1 40.3 42.8 2.2 defined benefit
Denmark 10.3 65.0 65.6 36.3 42.5 — defined benefit
Germany 10.0 65.3 65.1 37.6 44.6 — points system
Estonia 7.6 63.0 64.4 47.5 30.4 0.6 defined benefit (points)
Ireland 7.4 65.0 64.9 28.0 27.9 — fixed benefit
Greece 16.2 67.0 64.4 36.6 65.6 2.2 defined benefit
Spain 11.8 65.0 62.8 28.9 59.7 2.3 defined benefit
France 14.9 65.8 60.8 43.9 51.3 1.8 defined benefit
Croatia 10.8 65.0 62.4 42.8 30.8 — points system
Italy 15.7 66.3 62.4 39.6 58.8 1.9 notional account
Cyprus 9.5 65.0 64.9 23.3 64.4 1.4 defined benefit (points)
Latvia 7.7 62.0 64.6 43.6 27.7 1.1 notional account
Lithuania 7.2 62.8 62.8 46.8 35.1 0.5 defined benefit
Luxembourg 9.4 65.0 60.2 45.9 51.3 1.8 defined benefit
Hungary 11.5 62.0 63.0 41.6 40.8 2.1 defined benefit
Malta 9.6 62.0 62.0 30.9 48.3 1.9 defined benefit
Netherlands 6.9 65.1 65.5 35.0 35.9 2.0 fixed defined benefit
Austria 13.9 65.0 62.5 39.9 41.2 1.2 defined benefit
Poland 11.3 65.3 63.9 34.0 47.9 1.0 notional account and 
defined benefit
Portugal 13.8 65.0 64.3 37.1 61.8 2.0 defined benefit
Romania 8.2 64.7 64.0 39.7 37.0 — points system
Slovenia 11.8 65.0 62.5 43.2 33.8 1.5 defined benefit
Slovakia 8.1 62.0 61.6 34.2 45.7 1.2 points system
Finland 12.9 66.0 63.6 39.2 52.1 2.9 defined benefit
Sweden 8.9 67.0 65.8 38.8 42.1 1.0 notional account
United Kingdom 7.7 65.0 64.9 31.5 36.4 — fixed benefit
Norway 9.9 67.0 65.6 33.6 47.0 0.9 notional account
CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES' PENSION SYSTEMS TABLE 1
SOURCE: 2015 Ageing Report.
NOTE: The selection of programmes included under the concept of a “pension system” and the statistical variables used to calculate their parameters can vary 
depending on the source. Consequently the information about these parameters does not always match and can vary according to the source used.
a As a percentage of GDP.
b Corresponding to men.
c Number of pensioners relative to population aged 15-64 years.
d Defined as ratio of average pension to average wage. Note that in some countries with a comparatively low replacement rate, such as the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Sweden or Denmark, the weight of private pensions is greater than in other countries.
e Rate at which pension rights accrue.
f Retirement pensions, main system.
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Of this total, expenditure on welfare benefits (added to that relating to top-ups to 
minimum contributory pensions to meet the legal minimum at any given time) is approximately 
1% of GDP (close to 0.25% of GDP, excluding the top-ups). Thirty-four percent of individuals 
aged over 65 receive welfare benefits, which is close to the OECD average (30%), although there 
is a high degree of dispersion between countries regarding this average. The average amount 
of welfare benefits, measured as a percentage of the average wage in the economy, is close to 
20% in Spain, somewhat higher than the OECD average, which stands at 18.9%. 
As regards contributions, measured as average values for the 2005-2015 period (see 
Table 2), around 60% of pensions and 68% of total expenditure corresponded to retirement;8 
26% of pensions and 19% of expenditure to widowhood benefits; approximately 11% of both 
expenditure and number of pensions to permanent disability benefits, and 3.5% of pensions 
and 1.5% of total expenditure to orphans’ benefits and family allowances. The past decade has 
seen an increase in the weight of retirement pensions which, on average, are 55% higher than 
the average for other types of pensions in 2015.
8 Including disability pensions which are known as retirement pensions when the recipient reaches 65 years of age. 
Percentage of total
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Average
2005-2015
Permanent disability
    Number of pensions
    Expenditure
   Average pension (a) 700.1 731.6 760.7 801.5 831.5 849.9 869.5 887.3 907.6 915.6 923.3 2.8
Retirement
    Number of pensions
    Expenditure
   Average pension (a) 686.6 722.7 760.0 814.5 854.1 884.1 915.2 946.4 979.5 999.8 1,021.2 4.0
Widowhood
    Number of pensions
    Expenditure
   Average pension (a) 455.3 476.7 498.3 529.0 553.9 571.7 586.4 601.6 617.6 624.0 630.6 3.3
Orphanhood
    Number of pensions
    Expenditure
3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.5 
1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 
   Average pension (a) 268.0 285.9 300.9 325.0 339.7 350.3 359.1 366.6 371.1 369.4 370.4 3.3
For family members
    Number of pensions
    Expenditure
   Average pension (a) 349.9 374.6 398.2 428.2 446.8 459.4 472.4 485.7 500.9 508.4 517.2 4.0
All pension types
   Average pension (a) 609.8 641.9 673.7 719.7 754.1 779.5 805.0 829.8 856.4 871.0 886.8 3.8
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS BY CLASS TABLE 2
SOURCE: Seguridad Social.
a Average pension in euros/month, paid 14 times a year. In this category, the 2005-2015 average is the average annual growth over the period.
10.4        
11.8        11.9 12.0 11.9 11.8 11.6 11.4 11.2 10.8 10.5 
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60.6 59.5
67.7
27.1 26.9 26.9 26.8 26.6 26.4 26.2 26.0 25.8 25.5 
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The contributory public pension system in Spain presents similarities with that of other 
European countries, but also has distinguishing features. Specifically:9 
—  The rate at which retirement pension rights accrue in Spain is relatively high compared 
with that of the other OECD countries. In Spain, this rate is 1.82% of the reference 
regulatory base for each contribution year, although it depends on the number of 
contribution years and the stage of the individual’s working life, compared with the 
OECD average of 1.34%.10
—  The number of years taken into account to calculate pensions is set at 20 in Spain 
(although it will gradually increase to 25 years by 2023), whereas in most OECD 
countries this calculation is based on the entire working life. 
—  In Spain, the contribution bases used for calculating the regulatory base of 
the pension are revalued in line with inflation, as in the majority of OECD 
countries.11
—  The most common revaluation mechanism in the systems of developed countries 
consists of indexing linked to price growth, while in Spain, after the most recent 
reform, it is conditional upon the financial equilibrium between the system’s 
expenditure and revenue, with ceilings and floors set in place (see Chapter 2.2).
—  In total, 19 OECD countries have maximum pensions amounting to, on average, 
around 149% of the average wage in the economy, compared with 165% in Spain, 
where, as in other countries, individuals who sufficiently delay their retirement 
or receive supplementary maternity benefits may obtain benefits exceeding the 
maximum pension.
—  The statutory retirement age, on average in the OECD and taking into account the 
legal framework of each country, is 64 years for men and 63.1 for women. In Spain, 
it currently stands at 65 years and five months, for both women and men, and will 
gradually increase to 67 years by 2027. Early retirement schemes are common in all 
countries, including Spain, with pension reductions depending on the length of the 
early retirement period. As a result, the effective retirement age in Spain (currently 
64 years) is below the OECD average.
—  In Spain, the retirement pension replacement rate, defined as the average pension 
to the average wage by employee, is significantly higher than that of the OECD 
(49.5%, compared with 42.1%). If measured as the ratio between the initial pension 
9   For more details, see OECD (2015).
10  The accrual rate is the percentage of the regulatory base of the pension obtained for each year of contribution. In 
Spain, the rate is 2.3% between 15 and 37 years’ contributions, as shown in Table 1. It is somewhat lower when 
compared with the average for other years in other countries, as pointed out in the text. 
11  In some cases, there is a mixed system of revaluation via price inflation and wage growth rates.
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and the last wage received before retirement, Spain is also among the countries 
with the highest replacement rates (81.9% in 2013, the highest in the EU). However, 
this comparison should take into account that in some countries, state pensions are 
significantly topped up with other private pension schemes.
2.2 Recent reforms of the Spanish pension system
Spain’s pension system has undergone different far-reaching reforms in recent decades.12 The 
first one was in 1985, when the minimum contribution base was raised from 10 to 15 years 
and the number of years used to calculate the regulatory base was increased from two to 
eight years prior to retirement. Although these measures substantially alleviated the system’s 
financial position, the number of pensions and the average pension amount continued to rise. 
Between 1980 and 1995 contributory pension expenditure increased from 5.6% to 8.4% of 
GDP and the ratio of number of persons registered in the system to number of pensions 
decreased from 2.7 to 2.1. 
This situation led to the approval by the Spanish Parliament in the plenary session of 
15 February 1994 of a proposal to prepare a report for the Budget Committee on the problems 
and reforms of the Social Security System. This report,13 known as the Toledo Pact, analysed 
both the background of the Social Security System and the factors that could condition its future 
operation, and included 15 general recommendations. 
The 15 recommendations of the Toledo Pact set the basis for the Agreement on 
Consolidation and Rationalisation of the Social Security System reached on 9 October 1996 
by the Spanish Parliament and the two major labour unions in Spain. This Agreement was 
subsequently enacted as Law 24/1997 on Consolidation and Rationalisation of the Social 
Security System, approved by Parliament on 15 July 1997. The changes introduced by this 
law included most notably the increase in the number of years used to calculate the regulatory 
base of pensions from 8 to 15, the revaluation of pensions on the basis of CPI projections and 
their revision based on deviations from CPI increases recorded in November, the setting up of a 
reserve fund to cover the system’s future needs using Social Security surpluses and the gradual 
elimination of contributory limits below the maximum. 
On 9 April 2001, the Government, the Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ 
Commissions, the Spanish Confederation of Business Organisations and the Spanish 
Confederation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises entered into an Agreement for the 
Improvement and Development of the Social Protection System, which was subsequently 
implemented by Law 35/2002 of 12 July 2002, under which retirement beyond age 65 was 
encouraged and early retirement was permitted from age 61 to workers registered with the 
Social Security after 1 January 1967, provided certain requirements were met. 
12  For greater detail on reforms prior to 2009, see Banco de España (2009).
13  Approval by Parliament in plenary session of the wording approved by the Budget Committee in connection with 
the report on the proposal to analyse the Social Security System’s structural problems and the main reforms to be 
implemented. Published in series E of the Official Parliament Gazette of 12 April 1995. 
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The Toledo Pact restricted its initial duration to five years, establishing that is was to 
be revised as from 2000. As a result of this revision, in the plenary session of 2 October 2003 
Parliament approved the report prepared by the ad hoc committee to assess the outcome of the 
implementation of its recommendations. After the renewal of the Toledo Pact, on 13 July 2006 the 
Agreement on Measures Relating to Social Security Matters was entered into by the Government, 
the General Workers’ Union, the Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ Commissions, the 
Spanish Confederation of Business Organisations and the Spanish Confederation of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises, which was enacted as Law 40/2007. The main changes introduced 
were the use of effective contribution days, instead of those relating to extra payrolls, in order 
to increase the number of effective years of contribution to 15 for pension calculation purposes; 
increasing the age limit for partial retirement to 61, provided the person had worked at least 6 
years in the same firm and was able to provide evidence of having made contributions during 30 
years; and the rationalisation of eligibility criteria for disability pensions.
The Social Security Reserve Fund was regulated by Law 28/2003 of 29 September 
2003 and by Royal Decree 337/2004 of 27 February 2004. Under Law 28/2003, priority is to 
be given to allocating the majority of any revenues deriving from a contribution surplus or the 
outturn of each year’s Social Security budget to the Reserve Fund. Setting up funds of this kind 
is customary in other countries, either for cyclical reasons (to cover transitory shortfalls caused 
by economic cycles) or more permanent reasons (to cover demographic imbalances that may 
hinder the Social Security’s financial position over the course of future generations). In the case 
of Spain, the reasoning underlying the fund and the size reached relate more to the first option 
than the second one.14
More recently, Spain’s public pension system has experienced two important reforms 
which mainly aim to adapt the system to the new demographic scenario projected for the 
future.15 Law 27/2011 of 1 August on the update, adjustment and modernisation of the Social 
Security System (in force from 2013), introduced significant changes to retirement eligibility 
requirements, such  as a phased-in increase in the legal retirement age, from 65 to 67; a 
gradual lengthening of the period considered to calculate the regulatory base of retirement 
pensions, from 15 to 25 years; and the obligation to provide evidence of having contributed to 
the system for at least 37 years in order to have access to 100% of the pension. This reform 
was completed through Royal Decree-Law 5/2013 of 15 March on measures fostering the 
lengthening of the working life of older employees and promoting active ageing, which revised, 
inter alia, the eligibility requirements for partial and early retirement, linking such eligibility to an 
increase in the retirement age. 
This reform process gained momentum with Law 23/2013 of 23 December regulating 
the Sustainability Factor and the Social Security Pension System Revaluation Index. Under 
this reform, a new mechanism was established to calculate the annual revaluation of pensions 
14  See, for example, the preamble of Law 24/1997 of 15 July on the consolidation and rationalisation of the Social 
Security System.
15 This scenario is detailed in Chapter 3.
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(starting in 2014) and the sustainability factor for retirement pensions was introduced (starting 
in 2019). The revaluation index uncouples annual pension updates from CPI increases, which 
had previously been linked, and sets the annual increase in pensions on the basis of a formula 
derived from the balance between the system’s revenue and expenditure, although such 
revaluation cannot be lower than 0.25% nor higher than the sum of 0.5% to the CPI increase. 
The sustainability factor, which will be implemented in 2019, will automatically link the initial 
retirement pension amount to life expectancy changes, but refers only to retirement pensions 
at the legal age (67), not individually to the pension of each new pensioner at retirement age, as 
occurs in notional defined-contribution accounts systems.16 The introduction of these elements 
placed Spain among the group of EU countries that have automatic adjustment mechanisms or 
sustainability factors for the public pension system. Thus, several countries link benefits or the 
legal retirement age to life expectancy (see Table 3). 
2.3  Recent trends in the public pension system’s revenues and expenses and their 
determinants
The Social Security System’s accounts have deteriorated significantly in recent years.17 Specifically, 
widening deficits have been registered since 2011, reaching 1.5% of GDP in 2015. This contrasts 
with an average positive balance of 1.1% of GDP registered in the period 2000-2008 and the 
balanced budget observed in the 1980s and the early 1990s (see Chart 1.1).
16 For a description of the mechanisms introduced by the 2013 reform, see Ramos (2014). 
17  The Social Security System is defined as a series of schemes through which the State guarantees people within 
its scope adequate protection against certain defined contingencies, such as retirement, illness, disability, accident, 
survival, etc.
Country
Sustainability
factor
Automatic adjustment
mechanism
Benefits linked to
life expectancy
Retirement age
linked to life expectancy
XkramneD X
XXynamreG
XeceerG X
XXXniapS
XXecnarF
XXXylatI
XsurpyC X
XXaivtaL
XsdnalrehteN X
XXdnaloP
XXXlagutroP
XaikavolS X
XXdnalniF
XXXnedewS
XXyawroN
SOURCE: 2015 Ageing Report.
AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES TABLE 3
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The deterioration in the pension system’s non-financial balance observed since the 
start of the decade is due to revenues remaining relatively stable while expenditure has been 
rising (both expressed as a share of GDP). Indeed, contributory pension spending (which 
represents approximately 82% of the social security system’s total non-financial expenses) rose 
from 7.6% in 2008 to 10.7% in 2015 (see Chart 1.2). This increase of 3.1 percentage points of 
GDP is the result of stagnant nominal GDP growth (GDP being approximately the same in 2015 
as in 2008) in conjunction with steady growth in contributory pension expenditure, although 
SOURCES: Seguridad Social and Banco de España.
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the growth rate has been slowing over the period considered. This moderation is basically due 
to the lower rate of growth of the average pension, rather than the number of pensions, which 
grew at an average rate of 1.52% (1.84% in the case of retirement pensions) between 2005 
and 2015, as can be seen in Table 4. Moreover, the increase in pension expenditure is due 
more to the growth in the number and average value of contributory retirement benefits than to 
other components of the public pension system (see Table 4). 
From an aggregate perspective, pension expenditure as a share of GDP depends 
on three types of factor.18 One is demographic: to the extent that pension expenditure is 
fundamentally linked to retirement pensions, this expenditure is greater the larger the relevant 
age group is relative to the working-age population (i.e. the higher the dependency ratio). The 
second factor is related to the state of the labour market: the smaller the proportion of the 
working-age population in employment (i.e. the lower the employment rate), the smaller GDP, 
18  This decomposition is the result of the following identities:
Where PE is pension expenditure, Y is GDP; NP is the number of pensions; WAP is the working-age population; L is 
the number of people in employment; AP is the average pension; and W is the average wage.
SOURCES: Seguridad Social and Banco de España.
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and therefore, the higher pension expenditure will be when expressed in GDP terms. The third 
factor has to do with the ratio between the average pension and average productivity in the 
economy, which is the product of the ratio between the average pension and the average wage 
(the pension replacement rate) and wages as a share of GDP (the labour income share). Thus, 
the higher the pension replacement rate, the greater pension expenditure. Similarly, for any given 
employment and replacement rates, this expenditure will be greater the higher the wage share 
of GDP.19 
Using this decomposition (see Chart 1.3) it can be observed that the increase in 
pension expenditure since 1980 is due, in approximately equal measure, to both increased 
demographic pressure (i.e. a higher dependency ratio) and a higher replacement rate (the ratio 
of the average pension to the average wage). The employment rate, whose increase played a 
major part in pension expenditure containment in the period from 1995-2007, has fallen over 
19  For any given employment and average wage, a higher share of wages in GDP implies lower apparent labour 
productivity.
Percentage
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Average
2005-2015
Permanent disability
    Number of pensions 2.17 3.24 3.37 2.03 1.55 1.40 0.51 0.51 -0.90 -0.61 0.23 1.23
    Expenditure 7.45 7.11 9.07 5.75 4.90 4.94 1.69 2.41 1.41 0.25 1.10 4.19
    Average pension 5.25 4.50 3.99 5.36 3.74 2.21 2.31 2.05 2.29 0.87 0.84 3.04
Retirement
    Number of pensions 1.27 2.80 1.12 1.51 2.07 2.02 2.06 1.60 2.28 1.97 1.49 1.84
    Expenditure 7.04 7.40 7.82 7.09 6.62 6.89 4.74 4.67 5.87 4.07 3.66 5.99
    Average pension 5.81 5.26 5.16 7.17 4.86 3.51 3.53 3.40 3.50 2.07 2.14 4.22
Widowhood
    Number of pensions 1.38 1.43 1.30 1.10 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.59 0.57 0.52 0.21 0.88
    Expenditure 6.69 5.43 7.41 5.61 5.24 5.44 2.77 2.53 3.27 1.56 1.26 4.29
    Average pension 5.36 4.71 4.53 6.16 4.70 3.22 2.57 2.58 2.67 1.04 1.05 3.51
Orphanhood
    Number of pensions -1.45 -0.95 -0.80 0.50 1.84 1.80 1.57 4.44 6.96 6.79 3.94 2.24
    Expenditure 6.00 4.80 5.98 6.90 6.07 6.36 3.73 5.82 8.32 6.32 4.12 5.86
    Average pension 7.85 6.68 5.26 8.01 4.51 3.12 2.52 2.08 1.24 -0.46 0.26 3.73
For family members
    Number of pensions -2.28 -2.37 -2.10 -1.30 -0.19 -0.14 0.58 0.86 -1.30 1.65 1.65 -0.45
    Expenditure 4.43 3.78 5.52 4.54 3.78 3.95 3.00 2.87 1.84 3.20 3.46 3.67
    Average pension 6.92 7.05 6.32 7.52 4.36 2.80 2.84 2.81 3.13 1.49 1.74 4.27
All pension types
    Number of pensions 1.28 2.33 1.33 1.41 1.68 1.63 1.55 1.30 1.63 1.49 1.12 1.52
    Expenditure 7.00 6.92 7.86 6.63 6.13 6.36 3.99 4.01 4.91 3.22 2.96 5.45
    Average pension 5.75 5.27 4.96 6.83 4.78 3.37 3.27 3.08 3.20 1.71 1.81 4.00
SOURCE: Seguridad Social.
CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF PENSIONS, EXPENDITURE AND AVERAGE PENSION TABLE 4
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the past decade as a consequence of the crisis, and has therefore contributed to increasing 
the weight of pension expenditure as a share of GDP (see Charts 1.3 and 1.4). In recent years, 
moreover, the average pension has grown significantly faster than the average wage or the CPI. 
This effect is partly due to pension revaluation (except in 2014 and 2015) and partly to other 
factors, such as the substitution effect (see Charts 1.5 and 1.6), which includes the fact that the 
pensions of new retirees joining the system tend to be higher than those of pensioners who die. 
Moreover, part of this increase in the replacement rate is due to lower productivity growth, which 
averaged 1.6% in real terms, compared with average pension growth of 1.8%. Other factors, 
such as the increase in minimum pensions have also contributed. In this regard, the three panels 
of Chart 2 show the main determinants of the trend in the average pension with respect to its 
composition in terms of pension amount brackets. First of all, minimum pensions can be seen to 
have been on an upward trend since the early 1990s, resulting in a slight increase in their ratio 
to the average wage. Secondly, it is worth noting that the maximum pension fell relative to the 
average wage between 1984 and 1992, and to a lesser extent as of 2007.  In the case of the 
most recent period (2005-2015), it can be seen that the weight of maximum pensions has risen 
considerably, while that of smaller pensions has declined. This change is particularly marked in 
the case of retirement pensions.
SOURCE: Seguridad Social.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Less than
minimum
wage
Min. wage 
to €1,000
€1,000.01
to €1,500
€1,500.01
to €2,000
€2000.01 to 
max.
pension
Maximum
pension or
higher
 2005  2010  2015
2  DISTRIBUTION OF PENSIONS BY AMOUNT
%
TRENDS IN MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM PENSIONS AND DISTRIBUTION OF PENSIONS BY AMOUNT CHART 2
0
50
100
150
200
250
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
 RETIREMENT  DISABILITY - MAJOR DISABILITY  WIDOWHOOD  MAXIMUM PENSION
1  MINIMUM PENSION BY CLASS AND MAXIMUM PENSION
% of average wage
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Less than
minimum
wage
Min. wage 
to €1,000
€1,000.01
to €1,500
€1,500.01
to €2,000
€2000.01 to 
max.
pension
Maximum
pension or
higher
3  DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT PENSIONS BY AMOUNT
%
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1701
With regard to income, social contributions are the Social Security System’s main source 
of funding (accounting for approximately 85% of its total resources), followed by transfers from 
central government to cover non-contributory pensions and minimum pension top-ups, which 
have been financed entirely from general taxes since 2013. In GDP terms, income from social 
contributions are defined as the product of the effective rate of social security contributions and 
the wage share of GDP. The ratio of social security contributions to GDP has remained relatively 
constant at around 9.4%, with a drop of a few tenths of a percent during periods of crisis (1979-
1985, 1992-1994 and, most recently, 2010-2015 – see Chart 1.2). This is a result of an increase 
in the effective rate of social security contributions and a decrease in the wage share of GDP. 
The latter has also behaved somewhat procyclically since the mid-1990s (see Charts 1.7 to 1.9). 
As regards other sources of income, it is noteworthy that the contribution of financial revenues 
to the Reserve Fund came to 0.4% of GDP. However, this has decreased recently as a result of 
the decline in accumulated capital and falling interest rates on Spanish public debt, this being 
the asset in which the largest share of this capital has been invested. 
Indeed, after various allocations, the Reserve Fund reached 6.2% of GDP in 2011. 
Subsequently, the system’s deficits have caused this to drop by 4.8  pp of GDP to 1.4% of 
GDP at the end of 2015 (see Chart 1.10). The Reserve Fund’s current allocation is equivalent to 
approximately 13% of annual expenditure on contributory pensions.
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3 Looking forward: long-term pension expenditure projections
3.1 Demographic scenario
The profound demographic transformation experienced in recent decades, characterised by 
a sharp fall in the birth rate and an increase in life expectancy, has substantially changed the 
structure of Spain’s demographic pyramid, which has narrowed at the base and widened at the 
top (see Charts 3.1 and 3.2). 
SOURCE: INE.
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The increase in longevity and the progressive ageing of the population are trends that 
are common to most developed countries. However, according to the demographic projections 
available, Spain is one of the countries where the weight of the retirement-age population will 
increase the most. Specifically, the latest projections by the National Statistics Institute (INE), 
published in 2016, predict that the ageing process will step up in the coming decades.  On one 
hand, the birth rate, which in 2015 stood at 9.0 births per one thousand persons (less than half 
that of 1975), is expected to decline to 6.6 births in 2030 and to 5.6 in 2060. On the other, life 
expectancy, which has risen substantially in recent decades, is expected to continue to do so in 
the future, at possibly higher rates. Specifically, today’s 65-year-olds are expected to live almost 
6 years longer than those aged 65 in 1975, and almost 8 years less than those who will be 65 
in 2060 (see Chart 3.5). Finally, migration projections point to a small net inflow of persons until 
the end of this decade, in contrast to the strong inflow of working-age immigrants that came to 
Spain during the economic boom.
The combination of these three factors, together with the weight of the baby boomers 
(those born between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s), who will reach retirement age from 
the second half of the upcoming decade, will speed up the process of transforming Spain’s 
demographic pyramid into what will increasingly look like an inverted pyramid (see Charts 3.3 
and 3.4). Indeed, the 67+ age group, which accounted for around 10% of the population in the 
early 1980s, today accounts for more than 16% and is expected to represent more than 30% 
starting in 2040 (see Chart 3.6). 
3.2 Illustrative estimates of the impact of population ageing on the pension system 
Addressing the increase in spending associated with the projected rise in the dependency ratio is 
a major challenge for public pension systems in developed countries. Based on the breakdown of 
pension spending relative to GDP as a product of the dependency ratio, the inverse value of the 
employment rate, the replacement rate (defined as the average pension to average wage ratio), and 
the share of wages in GDP (see footnote 18), it is possible to extrapolate the changes in pension 
spending to the outcome of the changes in such factors and to proxy the impact of changes in each 
of these factors on pension spending.20 The analysis set out under this caption has an aggregate 
perspective and a basically illustrative purpose. Nonetheless, its results are not qualitatively different 
from those reached by means of a more ambitious modelling of interactions between the variables 
determining public pension system expenditure and revenue (see Section 3.3).
There is some uncertainty as to the performance of the foregoing four factors. The 
dependency ratio will basically depend on the effect of immigration and on legal changes to 
the retirement age that will influence the size of the working-age population.21 The employment 
rate, for its part, will depend on developments in the labour market and on the age cohorts 
20  In exercises of this kind it is customary to assume that the revenue-to-GDP ratio remains stable if there are no legislative 
changes impacting the effective rate.
21  With such a short horizon as that envisaged, the effects of the uncertainty associated with changes in the birth rate and 
in longevity, further to changes already made in the population projections available, are less significant. An analysis 
of the sensitivity of the demographic projections to starting point assumptions can be found, for the case of Spain, in 
Hurtado (2001).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1701
considered to be in the working age population.22 The pension replacement rate depends on 
future regulatory changes to the calculation of contributory pensions, together with those already 
made (sustainability factor and revaluation index) and the productivity growth rate.23 The weight 
of wages in GDP is also affected by cyclical factors but its variation range is limited. 
To illustrate how potential changes in these factors may impact the performance of 
public pension system expenditure, we consider below several alternative scenarios. For the 
demographic scenario we use the population projections by the INE (see Table 5), considering 
the working age population to be between 16 and 66 years old.24 Consequently, the ratio of 
number of pensions to working age population would be 42.7% in 2035 and 64.3% in 2050.25 
As regards employment rates, two alternative scenarios are envisaged: one where the current 
values are maintained (approximately 60%) and another much more favourable one, where it is 
assumed that the rate increases to 70%.26 Two scenarios are also considered for the replacement 
rate: one where the current levels are maintained and another one where the rate is reduced to 
approximately one half owing to matters such as, for example, the impact of the sustainability 
factor and the revaluation index, other already approved legal changes to the calculation of 
retirement pensions and greater productivity growth.27 Finally, the assumption for the wage 
22  Employment rates for individuals close to the legal retirement age are usually lower than average. Therefore, retirement 
age increases can be expected to be associated with a decrease in the employment rate. 
23  Increases in the productivity growth rate instantaneously pass through to average wages, whereas current pensions, which 
depend on prior year wages and are not revalued based on productivity increases, do not change.  Accordingly, such 
increases in the productivity growth rate give rise to transitory decreases in the average retirement pension replacement 
rate. However, insofar as existing pensions are indexed below the increase in productivity, productivity growth generates a 
permanent decline in expenditure through the decline in the replacement rate.
24  Data from INE’s demographic projections for 2016-2066 (http://www.ine.es/inebaseDYN/ propob30278/propob_inicio.htm). 
25  Under the assumption that the ratio of number of pensions to retirement-age population currently observed remains 
unchanged (1.068).
26  The full employment objective under the EU 2020 strategy consists of attaining an employment rate of 75% among 
the population aged 20 to 64. Bear in mind that the calculations in this paper consider the working age population to 
be that comprising individuals between 16 and 66 years old and, accordingly, the value established in the simulation 
at hand does not differ much from the objective set by the EU. 
27  Notably, the reform of 2013 implies a decline in the future replacement rate from the current levels (see caption 3.3). 
Thus, the simulations of Table 6, where the current replacement rate is maintained, aim to illustrate the consequences 
on pension expenditure that would arise from a higher replacement rate under the demographic scenario projected 
for the medium and long term. 
2050 2035 2016
Number of persons
346,262,03845,522,72931,299,2246-61    
480,312,13940,975,82182,290,4266-61    
720,116,23139,255,03005,119,5296-61    
083,107,8928,577,21868,806,51+56    
839,057,7823,224,11627,805,41+76    
699,253,6644,844,9705,986,21+07    
Demographic factor*
%7.03%1.05%5.2746-61/+56    
%5.62%7.24%3.4666-61/+76    
%8.02%0.33%3.2596-61/+07    
SOURCES: INE (2016) and in-house calculations.
*Includes the factor corresponding to the current ratio of the number of pensions to the population of retirement age (1.068).
POPULATION PROJECTIONS BY AGE GROUP AND RELATED DEPENDENCY RATIOS TABLE 5
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bill/GDP ratio is that it will remain at around 48%, which is the approximate average value 
observed during the 1980-2015 period (see Chart 1.9).
The six scenarios in Table 6 show the results of such calculations, and the messages drawn 
from them are clear. A highly favourable performance of employment (reaching an employment rate 
of 70% of the population aged 16 to 66 in 2035) would enable maintaining pension expenditure 
below 13% of GDP in 2035 with a replacement rate similar to the current one (0.44), but it would 
rise to 19.4% of GDP in 2050 under this scenario. Under the least favourable scenario, with an 
employment rate of 60% of the population aged 16 to 66, pension expenditure in 2035 would be 
15% of GDP if the replacement rate were to remain stable, at 44%, and the latter would have to 
fall to 35.1% in order to maintain pension expenditure at 12% of GDP; however, reaching the same 
level of expenditure in 2050 under this scenario would require the pensions replacement rate to 
decrease to 23.3%. These calculations evidence the importance of the behaviour of employment: 
a 10 point increase in the employment rate enables pension expenditure relative to GDP to decline 
by 3.2 pp (if the current replacement rate is maintained) or by 2 pp (if it falls to 25%). In any case, 
even if the employment rate were to perform very favourably, in order for pension expenditure to 
remain similar to its current level, the pension replacement rate would have to decline significantly 
unless there is an increase in the revenue used to fund this expenditure. 
Obviously, in addition to the uncertainty associated with the performance of the employment 
rate, the scenarios envisaged in Table 6 may also change in the event of changes to the demographic 
variables impacting the dependency ratio and which may give rise to scenarios differing from those 
projected by the INE in 2016. In this connection, there are probabilistic projections allowing bands 
of statistical significance around these demographic estimates to be established. Annex 1 includes 
those relating to two dependency ratio measurements (relating to persons aged over 65 and 70) 
and, as can be seen, the difference between such rates under the baseline scenario and their lowest 
value, with a probability of 95%, is approximately 10%. If it is also considered that the ratio of the 
number of pensions to number of retirement-age persons is reduced to one (instead of the current 
1.068), the demographic factor values would be approximately 18.5% lower than those envisaged 
in Table 6. Therefore, under this extremely favourable (and unlikely) demographic scenario, pension 
expenditure and the effective tax rates on social contributions required to sustain pensions would be 
those of Table 6 multiplied by a factor of 0.815, while the replacement rates necessary to maintain 
pension expenditure at 12% of GDP would be those of Table 6 multiplied by 1.227 (=1/0.815).
Table 6 includes pension expenditure associated with the combination of employment 
scenarios with a more benign dependency ratio, which could be achieved, for example, by 
increasing the retirement age. The results show that with a dependency ratio of 52% (the 
demographic factor resulting from assuming the working-age population to comprise the 
population aged between 16 and 69 years), i.e. 12 points below the baseline scenario ratio, and 
a favourable performance of employment, if it is intended to maintain the pensions replacement 
rate at its current level (43.9%), pension spending would stand at 15.8% of GDP in 2050, almost 
4 points less than that associated with a dependency ratio of 64.3%. In any event, such a level 
of public expenditure to GDP in 2050 is about 5 points higher than that seen currently. 
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All of the foregoing calculations lead us to conclude that, in the absence of pension system 
revenue increases, the replacement rate would have to decrease to ensure the sustainability of the 
pension system. It should be noted, however, that a decline in the pension replacement rate does 
not necessarily mean that the absolute value of the pensions will be lower. Sufficient average wage 
increases could enable positive growth rates in the average pension to continue while pension 
replacement rates decline. Indeed, given the duration of the calculation period for the regulatory 
base of pensions and retirement, the higher the wage growth rate (which, in principle relates in 
Percentage
Scenario
Pension
expenditure
as a
% of GDP
Demographic
factor
Replacement
 rate 
Employment
rate
Wage bill
Effective rate 
of social
contributions
sustaining pension 
expenditure (a)
%2.12%9.34%8.55%9.34%0.137.01noitautis tnerruC
Current replacement rate
    Unfavourable employment 1 22.6 64.3% 43.9% 60.0% 48.0% 47.1
    Very favourable employment 2 19.4 64.3% 43.9% 70.0% 48.0% 40.4
3.830.840.069.343.254.81oitar ycnedneped rewol + 1    
8.230.840.079.343.258.51oitar ycnedneped rewol + 2    
Reduced replacement rate
    Unfavourable employment 3 12.9 64.3% 25.0% 60.0% 48.0% 26.8
    Very favourable employment 4 11.0 64.3% 25.0% 70.0% 48.0% 23.0
8.120.840.060.523.255.01oitar ycnedneped rewol + 3    
7.810.840.070.523.250.9oitar ycnedneped rewol + 4    
Pension expenditure 12% of GDP
    Unfavourable employment 5 12.0 64.3% 23.3% 60.0% 48.0% 25.0
    Very favourable employment 6 12.0 64.3% 27.2% 70.0% 48.0% 25.0
Current replacement rate
    Unfavourable employment 1 15.0 42.7% 43.9% 60.0% 48.0% 31.3
   Very favourable employment 2 12.9 42.7% 43.9% 70.0% 48.0% 26.8
2.420.840.069.340.336.11oitar ycnedneped rewol + 1    
7.020.840.079.340.339.9oitar ycnedneped rewol + 2    
Reduced replacement rate
    Unfavourable employment 3 8.5 42.7% 25.0% 60.0% 48.0% 17.8
   Very favourable employment 4 7.3 42.7% 25.0% 70.0% 48.0% 15.2
8.310.840.060.520.336.6oitar ycnedneped rewol + 3    
8.110.840.070.520.337.5oitar ycnedneped rewol + 4    
Pension expenditure 12% of GDP
    Unfavourable employment 5 12.0 42.7% 35.1% 60.0% 48.0% 25.0
    Very favourable employment 6 12.0 42.7% 41.0% 70.0% 48.0% 25.0
2050
2035
ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATIONS OF PENSION EXPENDITURE UNDER ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS TABLE 6
d b e
α
SOURCE: In-house calculations.
NOTE: d, b, e and α, are defined in Chapter 4 of this document. 
a The current value is the effective rate of social contributions, calculated as revenues from social contributions as a percentage of compensation of employees less 
social contributions. The effective rate sustaining pension expenditure would be 24.4%. 
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the medium term to the productivity growth rate), the lower the replacement rate, even if pensions 
increase at the pace productivity grew over the working lives of retirees.28 For example, in a situation 
where the calculation period for the regulatory base of a pension is 25 years of working life (as will 
be the case in 2023), assuming a 20-year retirement period without revaluation of pensions in line 
with wage growth, the average replacement rate during the entire retirement period would be 80% 
of the pension rights generated in connection with the latest wage if annual productivity grew at a 
rate of 1%, but would be 65% of such an amount if the annual productivity growth rate were 2%. 
In short, higher productivity growth rates would allow retirement pensions to be higher even when 
their replacement rate were lower, thereby improving the standard of living of retirees even though 
their income relative to working age population cohorts would decrease.29
3.3 Projections of public expenditure on pensions
Beyond the merely illustrative projections discussed in the preceding caption, the Ageing 
Working Group (AWG) of the European Commission regularly prepares long-term public pension 
expenditure projections for all the EU countries on the basis of models prepared by each of them, 
which include features specific to each national pension scheme and are based on common 
demographic and macroeconomic projections. These projections are published in the “Ageing 
Reports” (see footnote 6). The two most recent reports were drawn up in 2012 and 2015, which, 
in the case of Spain incorporate the reforms of 2011 and 2013, respectively.  Additionally, other 
authors (see, for example, Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2016), and Sánchez (2014)), have 
recently projected long-term expenditure on pensions in Spain on the basis of general equilibrium 
models that try to take into account interactions between all the significant variables.30, 31
The main conclusions of these papers can be summarised as follows: 
—  Under the 2011 reform,32 it would be possible to save between 30% and 40% of 
the long-term projected pension expenditure in the absence of these measures, 
although, if the demographic projections described were to be confirmed, they 
28  If wages grow at a constant rate, e.g. wt = (1+γ)wt-1, where γ is the productivity growth rate, the regulatory base of the 
retirement pension relative to the wage in the first retirement period (t) would be:
The average replacement rate over the retirement period would be: 
It is assumed that the calculation period for the regulatory base of the retirement pension, such as that which will be 
reached in 2023 in Spain, is the last 25 years of working life. A 20-year retirement period is assumed. This calculation 
does not take into account the possible impact of the pension ceiling, which could lower the replacement rate 
calculated previously by several percentage points. Additionally, an upturn in productivity growth gives rise to an 
additional transitory decline in the replacement rate during the period in which the cohorts that experienced lower 
productivity growth over their working life begin retirement.
29  These calculations assume that pensions are revalued on the basis of the inflation rate. Otherwise, the aforementioned 
replacement rates would be lower, by approximately 6.5 pp and 5 pp, respectively, per inflation point.
30  For example, demographic changes will have consequences not only on the dependency ratio, but also on many 
macroeconomic variables impacting the remaining factors that determine pension expenditure (see Aksoy et al., (2015)). 
Also, increases in the effective rate of social contributions have an adverse effect on employment and, therefore, reaching 
the employment rates assumed in Table 6 may be incompatible with the effective rate associated with each case. Likewise, 
the macroeconomic assumptions in this Table may not be entirely consistent with the demographic developments assumed 
and the impact on income and interest rates of changes in the public pension system parameters included in the projections.
31  For a description of several pension expenditure projection methods, see Jimeno et al. (2008). 
32  Its main features were an increase in the legal retirement age, the extension of the period used to calculate the 
regulatory base and an increase in the number of years required to opt for 100% of the regulatory base.  
1
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would not ensure the sustainability of the system on their own.33 For example, the 
2012 AWG report on ageing, incorporating the reform of 2011, estimated that 
pension expenditure would change from accounting for 10.1% of GDP in 2010 to 
13.7% in 2060 (see Chart 4.1), i.e. an increase of 3.6 points of GDP as compared 
with the estimate of the report prior to the reform, which forecast an increase of 
nearly 8 points. Therefore, the reform contributed significantly to reducing the 
expected increase in pension spending, but the system’s financial sustainability 
was still not ensured without resorting to new spending cuts or revenue increases.34
—  The reform of 201335 has made substantial headway in stabilising public expenditure 
on pensions relative to GDP. For example, pursuant to the latest Ageing Report 
published in May 2015, which therefore incorporates the effects of the 2013 
reform, pension spending will remain stable during much of the projection horizon, 
accounting for 11.8% of GDP in 2013, 11.9% in 2040, 12.3% in 2050 and 
11.0% in 2060 (see Chart 4.2). The studies by Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra 
(2016) and Sánchez (2014), which simulate the effects of the 2013 reforms, also 
coincide in pointing out that the introduction of the sustainability factor and the 
new revaluation index would have improved the system’s long-term financial 
sustainability considerably, without incorporating additional revenue increases, in 
a scenario where inflation would return to values close to the ECB’s target, around 
2%, and the aforementioned revaluation indices and sustainability factor would 
reach full effectiveness. Indeed, a simple simulation exercise enables us to see that 
the 2013 reform reduces both initial pensions and annual pension revaluations, 
automatically improving the system’s balance (see Annex 2). Notably, however, as 
mentioned above, the reform of 2013 establishes that the revaluation of pensions 
cannot be lower than 0.25% or higher than the result of adding 0.50% to the CPI 
increase. This makes it possible to prevent pensions from declining in nominal 
terms, but limits the automatic pension expenditure adjustment mechanism. Thus, 
adverse macroeconomic scenarios, in particular those associated with inflation 
rates below 2%, could still cause imbalances in the system, as illustrated by certain 
alternative scenarios considered by the Ageing Report and, especially, by Sánchez 
(2014,Charts 4.4 and 4.5).
—  In accordance with these estimates, the stabilisation of pension expenditure at levels 
similar to the current ones would be achieved through a substantial reduction of the 
replacement rate. Under the post-reform baseline scenario of Sánchez’s simulation 
(2014), the actual pension of a person retiring in 2015 is projected to be 7% and 24% 
33  In the 2012-2015 Stability Programme Update, the Spanish government forecast a saving of approximately 40% of 
the projected increase in pension spending between 2010 and 2050 prior to the reform. De la Fuente and Doménech 
(2013) estimate a saving of 33% in 2050 relative to projected expenditure without the reform; Conde-Ruiz and González 
(2013) calculate a saving of 29% and Banco de España (2011) of 43%.
34  The work by Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2016) and Sánchez (2014), simulating the impact of the reform on 
overlapping generation models of general equilibrium, reached the same conclusions.
35  Its salient features were the deindexation of pensions from the CPI and the introduction of a sustainability factor 
affecting the initial pension.
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lower 10 and 20 years, respectively, after retiring (see Chart 4.6). To this, one would 
add the operation of the sustainability factor, which would reduce the initial pension 
by approximately 10% in 2030 and 20% in 2050. Also, Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-
Saavedra (2016) estimate that average pensions in 2050 will be approximately 30% 
lower than average pensions under the regulatory period prior to the 2013 reform. 
SOURCES: 2012 and 2015 ageing reports, International Monetary Fund and in-house interpolation on the basis of Sánchez (2014).
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As for the projections of the AWG report, based on the macroeconomic scenario 
assumed36 (see Chart 4.3) around 35%-50% of the increase in expenditure arising 
from population ageing can be countered, while the impact of the 2013 reform 
on the replacement rate neutralises the rest of pressures on pension expenditure, 
which remain constant as a percentage of GDP, although it does so by means of a 
substantial decline in the replacement rate. Indeed, based on the estimates of this 
report, Spain would experience one of the sharpest declines in the replacement rate 
between 2013 and 2060 (approximately 20 pp), changing from having the fourth 
largest replacement rate in 2013 to the ninth in 2060 (see Chart 5). 
—  The key mechanism from the viewpoint of making headway in the sustainability 
of the system is the new revaluation mechanism (which leads to increases below 
the inflation rate for so long as a balance between the system’s revenue and 
expenditure is not achieved) and, to a lesser extent, the sustainability factor. The 
latter links retirement pensions to each generation’s longevity, aiming for part of 
the adjustment of the expense arising from the increase in life expectancy to be 
assumed by the generation enjoying it. By means of the revaluation index for 
retirement pensions, which is established on the basis of available funds, the reform 
makes pensioner generations participate at each point in time in the adjustments 
required to rebalance the system. 
—  More favourable scenarios in demographic or macroeconomic terms (measured 
by a lower increase in the dependency ratio or improved performance of the 
employment rate) enable the sustainability of the system to be achieved with lower 
decreases in the replacement rate of average pensions.
36  The unemployment rate is projected to converge from levels in excess of 20% and 25% in the base years to around 
7% from 2040-2045, while the participation rate would increase by 5.4 pp between the base year and 2040, when the 
minimum unemployment rate would be reached.
SOURCE: 2015 Ageing report.
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4 Public pension system reform: challenges and alternatives
Decisions concerning the design of a pension system have at least three dimensions. The first is the 
desirable size of the system, in terms of the public expenditure intended to be devoted to providing 
pensions. The greater the level of expenditure, the better able the system will be to provide an 
adequate income to replace wages or to act as a mechanism insuring against longevity and other 
covered contingencies. Secondly, for any chosen level of expenditure, the level and composition of 
the system’s funding sources need to be analysed to ensure that the system is financially sustainable. 
Finally, it also needs to be borne in mind that decisions about the foregoing factors have a major impact 
on how expenditure and the financial burden of pensions is distributed between various population 
groups and cohorts, i.e. in terms of the inter- and intragenerational equity of the public pension system.
As is clear from the pension expenditure projections discussed in Chapter 3, the 
relationship between the financial sustainability and sufficiency of public pensions hinges on the 
determinants of the system’s revenues and expenses. If the spending-to-GDP ratio is: 
g = dbα / e,
where g is the ratio of public pension expenditure to GDP, d is the ratio of the number 
of pensions to the working-age population, e is the employment rate, b is the ratio of the 
average pension to the average wage, α is wages as a share of GDP, and revenue is given by 
i = τα + β
where i is the ratio of public pension system revenue to GDP, τ is the effective tax rate of 
social contributions and β represents other resources used to finance the pension system in terms 
of GDP; then, for expenses to equal revenues (g = i), the replacement rate at which the system is 
in equilibrium is:
b* = (τ + β/α)e/d
In this static environment, this condition illustrates the trade-off between the availability 
of the public pension system’s resources and its sufficiency. In other words, the maximum 
pensions replacement rate that balances the system at all times depends on the taxes used 
to finance it (social security contributions and other taxes), demographic factors, and the 
employment rate. Sufficiency (measured as the ratio of the average pension to the average 
wage at any given moment in time, b*) may be higher when the employment rate and available 
resources (e, τ and β) are higher, when the demographic factor (d) and (provided that β > 0) 
wages as a share of GDP (α) are lower.
Consequently, the financial equilibrium constraint implies that to address the impact 
of demographic trends on the public pension system (which will cause the dependency ratio to 
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rise significantly), there are only two alternatives in this partial equilibrium framework once full 
employment has been achieved: i) reducing the pension replacement rate; and ii) broadening 
the sources of funding. Chart 6 illustrates this trade-off by comparing the situation prevailing in 
2015 with the combinations of revenues and pension replacement rate that would be feasible 
in 2050 given the projected demographic factor (d=64%) combined with two alternative 
employment scenarios (e=60% and e=70%), and on a scenario of a lower dependency ratio, 
associated, for example, with a further increase in the retirement age (d = 52%). The chart 
shows that even on the most optimistic scenario the effective rate that would balance the 
system given the current replacement rate would fall a long way short of balancing it in 2050. 
Thus, on all scenarios, maintaining the current replacement rate in 2050 would require a 
significant increase in the system’s resources. Moreover, the chart also shows that the current 
effective rate is below the rate that would balance the system at present, such that, given this 
effective rate, the replacement rate should be approximately 6 pp lower for the system to be 
in equilibrium. Alternatively, the replacement rate could be maintained with an effective rate 
approximately 4 pp higher.
In short, it may be concluded that, even on these relatively favourable scenarios, maintaining 
current replacement rates over the long term would require a significant increase to the system’s 
resources in 2050.
4.1 Reforms to curb rising expenditure
The projections presented in the previous section illustrate how, under the adverse demographic 
scenario outlined by the latest available projections, strict application of the recent reforms, on 
the assumption that the system’s revenue remains basically constant over the projection period, 
would imply that keeping expenditure levels stable would require a significant reduction in the 
replacement rate. This reduction would be achieved via the sustainability factor, which would 
reduce the initial pension received by new cohorts of pensioners in line with life expectancy, and, 
above all, via the pension revaluation index, which would imply a cut in pensions’ purchasing 
power until the system’s financial equilibrium is restored.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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In a context in which it is decided that the system’s resources should not be increased, 
there are other mechanisms that could generate the same reduction in the pension replacement 
rate, while increasing the extent to which the system is contributory, i.e. making the relationship 
between the contributions individuals pay and the benefits they receive closer. The contributory 
principle may be desirable, firstly, because it has positive effects on workers’ participation in the 
labour market, which has a positive impact on the system’s revenue and creates an incentive for 
them to extend their working life, and, secondly, because it facilitates pension saving decisions. 
One possible option would therefore be to further increase the number of years of contributions 
included in the calculation of the regulatory base for the retirement pension,37 for example, by 
extending the calculation period to the individual’s whole working life. Applying this measure 
would bring the Spanish system closer to that in a number of other European countries, such 
as Finland, Poland, Portugal and Sweden. Nevertheless, in the absence of other adjustment 
mechanisms, the reduction in expenditure obtained by this parametric reform is limited.38
With the same aim, the percentage of the full pension to which the minimum contribution 
period gives entitlement (currently set at 50%) could be reduced, as could the rate at which 
this initial percentage rises with each additional year of contributions, thereby increasing the 
number of years needed in order to obtain 100% of the full pension. The current legislation 
assumes that the majority of pension rights are generated in the first 15 years of an individual’s 
working life (creating entitlement to 50% of the pension, while the following 15 years generate an 
entitlement to a further 34%) such that the adjustment to these parameters may make benefits 
more proportional to the number of years of contributions. In any event, it should be noted that 
the 2011 reform has already made the requirements stricter.39 
Expenditure could also be curbed by further raising the retirement age. Following the 
recent reforms, the statutory retirement age will gradually rise to 67 years, although the effective 
age is around 64 years, as a result of the impact of early retirement. Raising the statutory 
retirement age can be justified by individuals’ longer life expectancy, their joining the workforce 
later, the reduced physical demands of most jobs today, and people’s better health at more 
advanced ages. 
Thus, any additional measures discouraging early retirement and allowing individuals 
to extend their working lives beyond the age of 67, following on from some of the measures 
already adopted in recent years, would have positive effects on financial sustainability, 
reducing the need for substantial cuts in the retirement pension replacement rate. Indeed, 
some countries (see Table 3) have opted to build in an automatic link between life expectancy 
37  The 2011 reform extended the period used to calculate the amount of the reference value of the pension (the “regulatory 
base”) from 15 to 25 years gradually at a rate of one month a year between 2013 and 2022.
38  See, for example, Sánchez (2014).
39  This established that 37 years’ contributions will be necessary to qualify for 100% of the regulatory base of the 
pension, whereby the first 15 years of contributions entitle pensioners to 50%, while the remaining 50% is obtained on 
a proportional basis with between 15 and 37 years’ contributions, using a month-by-month calculation. In this case a 
transitional period has also been set, commencing in 2013 and concluding in 2027. It is further established that, in the 
event of gaps in contributions, those relating to the first 24 months will be topped up with the minimum contribution 
base, and those exceeding 24 months, with 50% of the base.  This contrasts with the current legislation, where all 
gaps are supplemented with the minimum base (except in the schemes for the self-employed and domestic staff).
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and the permitted retirement age in their sustainability mechanisms. By way of illustration, as 
can be seen in Tables 5 and 6, raising the effective retirement age to 70, for example, would 
make it possible to reduce the dependency ratio by 12 points, compared with that associated 
with a retirement age of 67 years, which would enable pension spending to be reduced by 
between 2 and 4 points of GDP in 2050, depending on the scenario considered.40 For these 
purposes, however, the wide range of variation between different individuals’ working lives 
needs to be borne in mind. Systems allowing more flexible retirement at different ages are 
therefore superior to those not allowing earlier (or later) retirement, or which impose penalty 
(or accumulation) factors differing from those resulting from purely actuarial calculations that 
depend on contributions made over the course of the individual’s working life and differences 
in life expectancy and age at retirement.
The reforms alluded to above can be implemented by adjusting the current unfunded 
defined-benefit system’s parameters rather than modifying it. Nevertheless, extending the period 
over which the pension’s regulatory base is calculated to include the individual’s whole working 
life, equalising the rate at which pension rights accrue according to contributions paid, and 
applying the sustainability factor introduced by the 2013 reform individually (rather than applying 
it by cohorts as envisaged in the reform), are elements bringing the public pension system closer 
to the alternative chosen by some countries that have made reforms to their pension systems in 
recent decades, such as the individual notional defined-contribution accounts system. 
This system has a number of advantages. Firstly, it makes the relationship between 
individuals’ contributions and their pensions closer. Secondly, it reduces the negative impact of 
a drop in contributions at ages close to retirement on pension rights. Thirdly, the way pension 
rights are defined and benefits calculated takes place under more transparent conditions, 
creating incentives for the labour supply and complementary savings. Moreover, it automatically 
incorporates a sustainability factor to the extent that benefits are calculated as the annuity 
corresponding to the amount of accumulated contributions and life expectancy at the time of 
retirement, which also introduces more transparency and flexibility in decisions about when to 
retire. And this can all be achieved while still setting pension floors and ceilings to accommodate 
the degree of intragenerational distribution considered desirable.41 
In any event, it should be noted that the adoption of a notional defined-contribution 
accounts system of this type would necessarily be a gradual process, and would not eliminate 
the trade-off between the public pension system’s sufficiency and available resources alluded to 
above. To satisfy the financial sustainability condition, the notional defined-contribution accounts 
system requires precise calculations adjusting (notional) returns on accumulated contributions 
in individual accounts and the annuities constituting the retirement benefits in the prevailing 
demographic and macroeconomic scenario. 
40  Sánchez (2014) presents an evaluation of the 2011 pension reform, which basically affected these parameters, 
and shows that these parametric reforms are insufficient to entirely eliminate the expenditure growth caused by 
demographic change.
41 See Jimeno (2003).
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4.2 Changes in the funding sources
The alternative to reducing the pension replacement rate is to obtain additional revenues, either 
by increasing intergenerational transfers, which would mean a substantial rise in the effective rate 
of social security contributions, or by drawing on other taxes to pay for pension expenditure. 
In this regard, it is worth bearing in mind that, for reasons of economic efficiency, 
in a globalised world, with freedom of movement of capital and labour, the tax rate of social 
contributions cannot be much higher than it already is. 
One way of raising the effective rate of social contributions without changing statutory 
rates is to eliminate the floors and ceilings on the contribution base and the rebates reducing 
revenues from social security contributions. This measure would make the growth rate of 
contributions depend strictly on nominal wage growth, which does not currently happen for all 
income brackets as a result of the existence of floors and ceilings, which are updated in line with 
expected inflation (normally below growth in nominal wages). 
Eliminating these limits would mean equalising the effective rate for social security 
contributions with the statutory rate (28.3%) and, consequently, increasing this effective rate by 
approximately 8 pp (see Chart 6).42 This relatively large increase would raise labour costs, which 
could have negative consequences for employment and productivity. Finally, this measure could 
also raise future pension expenditure by increasing the regulatory base, which is the reference 
value used to calculate pensions, although this effect could be mitigated if the maximum pension is 
kept constant. However, if this is the case, it would lower the replacement rate and undermine the 
contributory principle for individuals accumulating pension rights exceeding the maximum pension. 
This is what has happened to a certain extent in recent years, by means of a process Conde and 
González (2014) have described as a “silent reform” (with increases to the maximum contribution 
base that exceed those of the maximum pension). 
Additional revenues and social security contributions could also be obtained by curbing the 
use of rebates and exemptions. The empirical evidence on the impact of rebates shows that they 
cause a substantial deadweight component and displacement effects. This results in their being of 
limited effectiveness as an incentive for new hiring. Restricting these incentives to well defined groups 
with employability problems would make them more effective and reduce their budgetary cost.
Alternatively, general taxes could be drawn upon to increase the revenues available to 
pay for pensions. One frequently cited example is France’s “generalised social contribution”. This 
social security contribution finances a portion of social security expenditure, of which the largest 
item is pension expenditure. It is “generalised” because it is paid by all taxpayers (including 
pensioners and recipients of capital income as well as workers) as a supplement on income tax 
(at rates that vary according to the amount of income and its nature). 
42  Removing the ceiling on the maximum contributory basis for common contingencies could generate additional 
revenues of up to €10 billion.
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A similar proposal to the above is to restrict the concept of contributory pensions to 
retirement pensions, which would continue to be funded from social security contributions, while 
other pensions (basically survivors’ pensions) would be funded from general taxes. This model 
would allow retirement pensions to remain contributory, while general taxes would be used to 
pay for other types of pension. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this measure would mean 
increasing general taxes or reducing other budgetary expenditure in order to be able to pay for 
those pensions transferred to central government from the social security fund.
Using general taxes to finance pensions raises at least two types of issue, however. 
One concerns the political economy facet of the pension system. An unfunded contributory 
system rests on transfers of income between different generations of workers and its essence 
is that there is a direct and transparent relationship between income and benefits that is 
separate from the redistributive role of general taxes and the political debate to which this 
redistribution is subject. The system’s contributory components may be considered to be 
smaller in the case of non-retirement pensions (survivors’ benefits and family allowances), 
however, which, as discussed, could justify taking these benefits out of the contributory 
system.
One issue that arises when resorting to general taxes to pay for pensions is the dilution 
of the pay-as-you-go principle when the pension system is not only paid for by intergenerational 
transfers. Increasing general taxes in order to pay for pensions would affect the population as 
a whole, including pensioners as well as workers. Thus, depending on how these taxes are 
distributed across the various age groups, it could happen that an increase in general taxes 
intended to pay for income for the retired population could largely fall on the very population 
whose income it was intended to protect. In effect, while an increase in the tax burden on wages 
is equivalent to an increase in the effective rate of social security contributions, if a share of 
these additional resources to fund pensions come from increased tax pressure on other income, 
including that from capital gains and monetary transfers such as pensions, even though the 
value of pensions remains unchanged, the population over the retirement age would see their 
SOURCE: In-house calculations using 2013 IEF-AEAT income tax sample (return filers).
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net income reduced by the impact of higher taxes. In other words, this measure at least partially 
resembles a cut in the replacement rate.43
It needs to be borne in mind here that the retired population receives the largest share of 
both capital income and transfers from the social security fund. Income tax microdata for 2013 show 
taxpayers aged over 55 to be a highly significant population group for this tax (see Chart 7).44 Thus, 
in 2013 18.4% of all taxpayers were aged over 65 and almost 15% aged between 56 and 65 years. 
The bulk of tax returns (around 65%) were filed by taxpayers in the 26 to 55 age group, with only a 
small number of returns from taxpayers aged under 25 (barely more than 3%; see Chart 7.1). The 56 
to 65 age group also has the highest average tax base. Consequently, it is the group that pays most 
per return, at approximately €4,900 (see Chart 7.2). For their part, taxpayers aged over 65 provided 
almost 16% of the tax collected, 5 pp more than tax payers in the 26 to 35 age group (see Chart 7.1). 
A simple exercise can be used to simulate a one percentage point rise in the general 
and savings income tax rates in order to analyse the impact on different age groups.45 The 
43  The relevant replacement rate from the individual’s point of view is the ratio of their pension to their final salary, net of 
taxes in both cases. Whether this replacement rate rises or falls will depend on the differential effect of the tax increase 
on wages and pensions.
44  The unit of measure is the tax return, i.e. including both individual and joint returns. 
45  Specifically, the baseline scenario was obtained by applying the rate schedule in force in 2015 to the 2013 income tax 
microdata.  The reform scenario was subsequently generated by simulating a 2 pp increase in general national rates 
and rates on savings income for all taxpayers.
SOURCE: In-house calculations using 2013 IEF-AEAT income tax sample (return filers), Household Expenditure Survey and CPI (INE).
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results show that tax collection would increase by approximately €2.4 billion, with about 50% of 
this increase falling on the 36 to 55 age bracket. It is particularly noteworthy that workers aged 
over 55 would finance over 35% of the increase. The 56 to 65 age bracket would experience 
the biggest increase in the tax burden in per capita terms, and taxpayers aged over 65 would 
see their tax burden rise to a level close to that of 36 to 45 year olds (see Charts 8.1 and 8.2). 
Another alternative way of financing public spending on future pensions might be to 
resort to increasing indirect taxes. This is in fact the preferred option among experts proposing 
alternatives for reforming the Spanish tax system,46 both for reasons of efficiency and as a result 
of the fact that, in the case of indirect taxes, the Spanish tax system continues to apply effective 
tax rates that are significantly lower than in comparable countries.47 In terms of the foregoing 
discussion of the possible distribution of a hypothetical tax increase across the different age 
brackets, a VAT increase of 1 pp on non-exempt goods would increase collection by €2.4 billion, 
with the population aged over 65 providing just over 20% of this increment. The 36 to 55 age 
bracket would bear the brunt of the adjustment (47%) although the increase in tax paid by age 
groups close to retirement age would also be significant, both in per capita terms and in terms 
of the average effective rate (see Charts 8.3 and 8.4).
4.3 Increased savings 
Against the background of a significant rise in the dependency ratio and reductions in the 
pension replacement rate, it might also make sense to extend the role of retirement saving to 
complement the resources of the public contributory system with the accumulation of financial 
assets supplementing future public pensions. In fact, a significant number of countries already 
have a relatively strong funded pillar to supplement the public pay-as-you-go pillar. However, 
it should be borne in mind that the funded system has its pros and cons. In particular, it is 
less vulnerable to demographic factors, making it potentially a good strategy in terms of risk 
diversification compared to the current pay-as-you-go model. However, the funded model is 
more sensitive to inflationary crises, and to financial market instability, as the experience of recent 
years has shown. Therefore, any steps in this direction need to be accompanied by the definition 
of better prudential systems to guarantee transparency and the protection of beneficiaries. 
In any event, implementing a funded system is complex and requires detailed prior 
analysis of issues such as the length of time needed to implement it, whether it is voluntary 
or compulsory, the returns that can be offered in a scenario of demographic stagnation and 
sluggish productivity growth, or how the costs associated with implementing this change are to 
be shared out between different generations. This analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
4.4 Distributive aspects of the reform
The distributive consequences of the public pension system are very important and are not 
limited to intergenerational income transfers or the varying contributions to general taxes made 
by the different age brackets discussed above. Benefit calculation formulae that vary according 
46  See Comisión de Expertos para la Reforma del Sistema Tributario Español (2014).
47  See Hernández de Cos and López (2014).
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to income levels also have repercussions for intragenerational inequality in ways that affect social 
equity. Thus, the existence of welfare benefits and floors and ceilings on contributory benefits, 
reduces intragenerational inequality. Moreover, the current formulae for calculating benefits in 
the existing system, which place greater weight on the years and contribution bases in the 
later stages of the individual’s working life, increases the inequality between each generation of 
pensioners, given that employment and wage inequalities are much wider among workers close 
to retirement than among young people starting out on their careers.48 
Consequently, any reform strategy, whether opting to curb expenditure restraint or boost 
income, makes it necessary to take into account the distributive consequences of changes to the 
parameters of the public pension system. In particular, in a purely contributory system in which 
benefits are calculated on the defined benefits principle, benefits are higher for those individuals 
who completed a longer working life and earned higher wages. Pay-as-you-go funding implies 
income transfers from younger cohorts to older ones, while tax funding implies transfers from 
higher income individuals (to the extent that the income tax system is progressive) to the retired 
population. 
There are two issues that need to be taken into account regarding intergenerational 
income transfers. First of all, to the extent that at a certain point in time the retired population 
took its saving and labour supply decisions in the light of certain expectations of benefits, making 
the burden of spending adjustment fall solely on that generation would imply reducing their levels 
of income and welfare disproportionately. On the other hand, making the whole weight of the 
reform fall on future generations of workers by raising intergenerational income transfers would 
also mean disproportionately reducing that generation’s income and welfare levels, which could 
also respond to these increases by reducing the labour it supplied. 
In the case of the most recent reform (2011 and 2013), for example, the available 
estimates, which assume that there would be no additional changes to taxes or spending 
parameters, indicate that the bulk of the cost of the adjustment would fall on those generations 
born between 1960 and 2000, and in particular the generation born in the 1990s.49 
Thus, any reform strategy has to consider: i) the extent to which the adjustment to 
pensions or the increased taxation necessary to rebalance the pension system’s financial 
situation falls on each generation; ii) over how many generations this adjustment is intended to 
be spread (i.e. how gradual the reform is to be); and iii) the extent to which pensions are intended 
to be used as a mechanism to address intragenerational inequality. Making the answers to these 
questions explicit should enable the reforms to be more transparent, and consequently, more 
comprehensible to the public.
48  The rates at which pension rights accumulate are higher at ages close to retirement, as the regulatory base depends 
on the contributions made in the last 25 years of the individual’s working life, and the penalties applied in the case 
of early retirement do not follow actuarial principles precisely. These rates also depend on wage variability, given the 
combination of floors and ceilings on both contribution bases and pensions.
49  See Sánchez (2014).
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5 Concluding remarks
The substantial growth in the population of retirement age relative to the working-age population 
brought about by improvements in longevity implies serious challenges for the Spanish public 
pension system. The reforms introduced in recent years have sought to address them by 
progressively raising the retirement age, defining a sustainability factor linking initial pensions 
to future trends in life expectancy, and introducing a new pension indexation mechanism that 
is conditional upon the system’s financial position being in equilibrium. Although these reforms 
have shored up the system’s sustainability considerably, adapting it to a progressively older 
population remains a major challenge. Specifically, in the absence of additional changes to the 
system’s sources of revenue, the main adjustment mechanism is via a cut in the average pension, 
which, in the context of marked growth in the dependency ratio, will lead to a substantial decline 
in the pension replacement rate, accompanied by a major risk of the retired population’s losing 
purchasing power in the event of an unanticipated rise in inflation. This would be a consequence 
of the new revaluation index, which could lead to systematic reductions in pensioners’ real 
income if inflationary scenarios of this kind materialise.
In this context it is first of all essential to define the pension replacement rate the public 
system aims to guarantee so as to be able to analyse whether the system’s revenues are 
sufficient to ensure its sustainability. The implications for intergenerational equity of the decisions 
made should also be made clear. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the existing analyses is that maintaining the 
system’s current replacement rates, which are high in comparison with those of other countries, 
would demand a considerable increase in the system’s revenues. If it were therefore decided 
that new revenues should be found to finance the desired level of spending, it seems reasonable 
that funding sources other than those currently being drawn upon should be sought, given that 
social security contributions are already high, and raising them could have a negative impact on 
the demand for labour. 
If it is decided that replacement rates should be reduced, the pros and cons of 
implementing this through a cut in initial pensions rather than changing the indexation of existing 
pensions, and the role the retirement age should play in the adjustment, need to be studied. 
Moreover, in this case the intended role of other forms of insurance and savings mechanisms to 
back up pensions from the public pay-as-you-go pension scheme in the future, such as those 
already implemented in other countries, should be defined.
In any event, recent reforms increase the uncertainty over future developments in 
pension levels, whether by application of the sustainability factor or the revaluation index, such 
that it needs to be implemented in the most transparent way possible in order to give the public 
the necessary information about the sufficiency of future pensions and allow individuals to make 
optimal savings decisions. 
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Moreover, following a series of reforms the Spanish public pension system retains 
a wide variety of contributory features, such that the rates at which pension rights accrue 
varies depending on the age at which contributions are made and variations in wages over 
the course of the individual’s working life. This ultimately means that retirement pensions are 
highly dependent on individuals’ job performance in the later years of their working lives. Thus, 
one potentially attractive avenue of reform –which has been followed by a number of other 
European countries aiming to simultaneously make the system more transparent and strengthen 
its contributory aspect– is to make the transition towards individual notional defined-contribution 
accounts. However, this approach does not resolve the basic questions of how generous the 
system should be and how it should relate to the resources used to pay for it.
Finally, beyond the adjustments made to the pension system, the challenges of 
population ageing need to be tackled as part of a broad economic policy strategy. First of all, 
it is essential to return to the path of fiscal consolidation and to resume the downward trend in 
public debt and meet the targets set in the Stability and Growth Pact (at European level) and 
the budgetary stability laws (at national level) over the medium-term, so as to ensure the public 
finances are better placed to address the issues raised by population ageing. Secondly, from 
the macroeconomic standpoint, the system’s fiscal sustainability problems could be alleviated 
by the economy’s making favourable progress in terms of employment and productivity. In this 
regard, Spain’s room for improvement is considerable and calls for structural reforms in various 
areas, such as the labour market, and goods and services markets, as well as education and 
training of workers. A long-term view needs to be taken to analysing the sustainability of the 
pension system, and this is perfectly compatible with the fact that many of the reforms needed 
to improve employment, and above all, the economy’s productivity, can only take effect over a 
relatively long period.
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Annex 1. Probability forecasts of dependency ratios
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Annex 2. An illustration of the effect of the sustainability factor and the pension 
revaluation index
The 2013 pension system reform introduced two automatic adjustment mechanisms with a 
view to ensuring the financial sustainability of the pension system. Firstly, the sustainability factor 
reduces the initial pension as a function of increases in life expectancy. Secondly, the revaluation 
index links the annual growth of existing pensions to the system’s budgetary constraints. 
This section presents a simple simulation exercise illustrating the effects of these 
mechanisms on the initial pension, pension revaluations, and the pension system’s budgetary 
balance. The simulation starts out with a series of demographic and macroeconomic assumptions 
in order to apply the pension indexation formula and the sustainability factor and thus forecast 
the growth in average pensions and pension system expenditure. It should be recalled that 
the indexation formula takes into account the system’s revenues, the number of pensions, 
the substitution effect, and the system’s balance, taking moving averages of 11 annual values 
centred on t + 1 (see Box 1 in Ramos, 2014).50
The macroeconomic and demographic scenario assumed is in line with the 2015 
European Commission report on ageing. An inflation rate of 2% has been assumed over almost 
the entire forecast period. Growth rates of around 1.8% have been projected for real GDP, in line 
with potential GDP trends in the report on ageing. Thus, the unemployment rate should gradually 
drop from its current level to around 7% in 2040-2045, while the participation rate should rise 
by 5.4pp between the base year and 2040. As regards productivity trends, long-term growth of 
around 1.5% in productivity per hour is assumed. The rise in the number of pensions is forecast 
to start accelerating in the coming decade as the baby boom generation reaches retirement age. 
The growth rate of new pensions would be approximately 2.2% a year after application of the 
50  The problem of the circularity of the revaluation formula has been resolved by keeping the revaluation constant and 
using the substitution effect observed in year t. For a description of the problem of the circularity of the revaluation 
formula and alternative methods for solving it, see Moral-Arce and Geli (2015).
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ASSUMPTIONS AND RESULTS OF THE ACCOUNTING SIMULATION TABLE A
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sustainability factor, which has been calculated using the latest INE forecasts.51 The substitution 
effect, i.e. the growth of average pensions in the absence of revaluation, would be approximately 
1 pp a year. The pension system’s main sources of revenues for the calculation of the revaluation 
index are taken as being exogenous and are estimated at 10.7% of GDP over the forecast 
period, which is approximately the level reached in 2015. The simulation’s assumptions are 
summarised in Table A.
The results can be seen in Chart A. On these assumptions, pensions will not rise by 
more than 0.25% at any time during the forecast period. In the first few years, revaluations would 
be weighed down by the need to correct the pension system’s deficits stemming first from the 
crisis and then from the increase in the number of pensions (see Chart A.1). For its part, the 
sustainability factor would reduce the initial pension by around 7% in 2013 and 12% in 2040 (see 
Chart A.2). The operation of the sustainability factor and the revaluation index would reduce the 
system’s deficit by approximately one tenth of a percent of GDP a year (despite upward pressure 
on expenditure from the increase in the number of pensions and the substitution effect), such that 
51  For simplicity, it is assumed that the sustainability factor is applied to all benefits, not just retirement pensions.
SOURCE: Banco de España
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the system would reach a state of equilibrium in the second half of the 2020s (see Chart A.3). This 
deficit correction would mainly be achieved through the revaluation index (see Chart A.4). This 
is because the sustainability factor only affects new pensions, whereas the revaluation index is 
applicable to the stock of existing pensions. Note that the calculation of the savings achieved by 
the reform takes a simulation in which pensions are linked to the CPI as its reference. 
The results of this simulation must be interpreted with caution, given that it is highly 
simplified and there is uncertainty surrounding the macroeconomic and demographic scenario, 
as well as over trends in the social security fund’s revenues. Nevertheless, this exercise illustrates 
the functioning of the automatic adjustment mechanisms introduced by the 2013 reform.
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